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1. Introduction 
An important policy issue in decentralised settings is what the Central Government 
(CG) should do when lower level governments realise a deficit. In many instances, 
the CG bails out regional debts. Evidence on this point – sometimes referred to 
improperly as a sign of the softness of local budget constraints – is widespread. 
However, to avoid future deficits, a standard policy suggestion in this case is to 
adopt effective measures to harden the budget constraint of local governments. This 
is thought to increase accountability of local politicians, hence to increase social 
welfare by reducing future wastes. Hardening the budget constraint, however, is not 
always thought to be a good idea. For instance, Besfamille and Lockwood (2008) 
suggest that an hard budget constraint can induce local governments to avoid 
socially desirable investments. This reflects an usual claim by local governments: in 
their view, the occurrence of a deficit is the consequence of an inadequate amount of 
resources needed to finance the provision of public services, and not evidence of 
wastes. Restraining the budget constraint, will then imply a lower provision of 
public services, hence a lower level of social welfare. 
The importance of this argument can be best understood when thinking to 
specific policies involving interactions between Central and local governments. One 
of these policies is surely health care. Assignment of health policy involve some 
actions by local governments almost everywhere (e.g., Saltman et al., 2007). In 
Federal countries (e.g., Canada, Australia) health policy is an exclusive 
responsibility of Regional Governments (RGs), although largely financed by federal 
government. In Regional countries (e.g., Italy, Spain) health policy is a joint 
responsibility of CG and RGs. In unitary countries (e.g., Nordic countries) there is a 
large role played by local governments in health policy. In all these cases, health 
expenditure stems from the interaction between different levels of government; and 
modern fiscal federalism theory suggests – in these cases – the likely presence of Soft 
Budget Constraint (SBC) problems: if CG cannot commit not to bail out over-
expenditure at the local level, SBC problems might arise, and RGs have incentives to 
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inflate health expenditure, as they expect the residents of other jurisdictions to foot 
the bill (e.g., Kornai et al., 2003). Indeed, the presence of massive bailouts in the 
case of health care policy is recognised by a large literature (see, e.g., Kornai, 2009). 
There is also evidence – at least for Italy – that bailout expectations matter in 
inducing fiscal discipline. As Bordignon and Turati (2009) show, CG can influence 
regional health expenditure behaviour by adjusting health care funding, and RGs 
react by adjusting spending: RGs expectations of a tighter CG in terms of funding 
imply then a tighter control on health expenditure. But what is the effect of this 
effort by CG to harden the budget constraint of local governments? If the story 
about a welfare improvement in hardening the budget constraint is right, then – by 
imposing a tighter control on expenditure – CG is eliminating only inefficiencies, and 
this should produce any real effects in terms of services produced for citizens. If the 
story is incorrect, then hardening the budget constraint will imply a reduction of 
services produced and a deterioration of social welfare. 
The aim of this paper is to provide an answer to this open question: does 
fiscal discipline affect structural (efficient) expenditure or simply inefficiency? In 
other words, does fiscal discipline towards sub-national governments has any real 
effects on citizens’ well-being, by influencing their health, e.g., via a reduction of the 
quantity or the quality of relevant health care services? Or it simply reduces the 
waste of public resources, e.g., by rationalizing the existing hospital network1 or 
improving service appropriateness? We assess inefficiency in public spending to 
produce citizens’ health, using several proxies for health status of regional 
populations in Italy, namely the average life expectancy at different ages and the 
infant mortality rate. We build on Bordignon and Turati (2009, BT09 from now on) 
to identify bailout expectations, and then test if only health expenditure 
inefficiencies, or also structural expenditure, are affected by fiscal discipline. In the 
                                                 
1 Capps et al. (2010) compare the impact on citizens’ welfare of hospitals closures versus hospitals 
bailouts. Using U.S. data, they show that savings from closures of urban hospitals more than offset 
disutility for patients for increasing difficulties in accessing care services. As the authors point out, 
however, «the fact that reductions in hospital costs are shared between local and federal payers, while 
access issues are fully local, tilts the local community’s calculus in favor of bailout in several cases». 
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former case, expectations affect waste; in the latter case, expectations affect citizens’ 
health. We find evidence supporting the idea that perceived fiscal discipline affects 
only inefficiency, and does not have any real effects on citizens’ well-being. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes 
the intergovernmental relationships in the Italian National Health Service (NHS). 
Section 3 sketches a theoretical framework to guide the following empirical analysis, 
by borrowing results from the model developed by BT09. Section 4 describes the 
data, the empirical strategy and the results. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
2. Institutional framework: the Italian NHS 
The Italian NHS – introduced by the Law 833 in 1978 – is a public universalistic 
scheme covering health care risks, and represents the central institution in the 
conduct of health care policy. Considering the time span covered by our sample, 
public health care spending in Italy reached 6.9% of GDP in 2006 from 6% at the 
beginning of the ‘90s, after touching a minimum of 5.2% in 1995, while per capita 
spending grew from about 870 euro in 1993 to 1700 euro in 2006. Even spending less 
than other comparable public systems,2 the Italian NHS obtained good results in 
terms of the (average) quality of services provided, and rank among the top 
positions according to international evaluations of the overall performance by the 
WHO (see, e.g., the World Health Report 2000).  
The increase in spending has been paired with an improvement in the 
population health, one of the basic component of citizens’ well-being (e.g., Deaton, 
2008). The average life expectancy at birth (ALE) and the infant mortality rate 
(IMR) are the proxy measures for public health commonly adopted in the literature 
(e.g., Turnock, 2007). ALE increased of about four additional years, from almost 80 
(74) at the beginning of the ‘90s to more than 84 (78) in 2006, respectively for 
females (males). IMR showed a steady decline, from 8.1‰ to 3.7‰. These figures 
                                                 
2 For instance, in UK, Germany and France, public health care expenditure in 2006 was 7.3%, 8.1% 
and 8.8% of GDP, respectively, while per capita values for the same countries were 2029, 2183 and 
2317 euro, respectively. 
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compare with an increase in ALE of about two years, from 81 (75) in 1997 to 83 (77) 
in 2006 for females (males) in the EU16 countries, and a decrease in IMR from 6.8‰ 
(5.2‰) in 1997 to 4.7‰ (3.8‰) in 2006 in the EU27 (EU16) countries.3 Similar 
trends characterize average life expectancy at different ages, and there is evidence 
suggesting that reduction in mortality following cardiovascular diseases or cancers 
(mainly driven by improvements in medical treatments) is crucial in explaining 
these numbers (e.g., Cutler et al., 2006). 
Health policy in Italy stems from a complex network of institutional and 
political rules. The Constitutional mandate on health care (which dates back to 
1948, and has been reformed in 2001) attributes to CG: 1) the definition and the 
guarantee of Essential Levels of Care (the so-called LEA, i.e., basically, national 
mandatory standards for health services); 2) the responsibility for framework 
legislation; 3) the ultimate responsibility for health care financing. Since its 
foundation in 1978, the funding of the Italian NHS followed (and still follows, at 
least to some extent) a sort of 3-stage process4. The first step is the ordinary funding: 
the CG define in December, with the Budget Law for the following year, the 
‘topping up’ on Regional revenues (a blend of earmarked taxes and tariffs). The 
second step is the redistribution among the Regions of these resources according to 
an ‘appropriation formula’, that involves also some bargaining between CG and 
RGs. Finally, the third step may be called extra-ordinary funding: the CG 
discretionally bails out RGs deficits, by deciding how much of the deficit cover and 
when to intervene. Since RGs are uncertain on CG intervention when they take their 
decision on spending, expectations of future deficit bailouts influence present 
expenditure decisions, either affecting only inefficiencies or hitting also structural 
expenditure. 
                                                 
3 Statistics for EU are included in EC Health indicators and are available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/health-eu/health_in_the_eu/ec_health_indicators/index_en.htm.  
4 We consider here the funding of the 15 Ordinary Statute Regions only. Rules for the 5 Special 
Statute Regions are largely different (see footnote 7 below). This is why these Regions are not 
included in the following empirical analysis. 
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Indeed, according to Constitution, RGs are in charge of the expenditure task 
in the Italian NHS. In particular, they are entitled of: 1) the organisation and the 
provision of health services (e.g., the management of hospitals and Local Health 
Units); 2) the provision of additional services with respect to the mandatory national 
standards (LEA). As there are 15 Ordinary Statute Regions (plus 5 Special Statute 
Regions), even in the presence of these national mandatory standards, it is not 
surprising that there are territorial differences among RGs along several dimensions: 
per-capita spending, the organisation of health services provision (and associated 
inefficiencies), population health. Evidence on inefficiencies in the provision of 
health care services (which sometimes degenerate in genuine cases of corruption) are 
widespread in all RGs. If we take citizens’ satisfaction for medical assistance in 
hospitals as an indirect proof of inefficiencies, we obtain the situation depicted in 
Figure 1. With some exceptions, there seems to be a clear gradient in satisfaction 
from the North to the South of the country. 
 
Figure 1. People very satisfied with medical assistance in hospitals (2006) 
 
1st  quintile
2nd
3rd
4th
5th quintile
Source: ISTAT – Health for All 
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How expectations of future bailout can impact on this situation? As we will 
discuss in more details below, the recent Italian history suggests that CG has done 
its best to influence bailout expectations in the direction of hardening the budget 
constraint; and this action was effective during the ‘90s (BT09). What we study in 
this paper is whether hardening the budget constraint has had any real effects on 
citizens’ welfare, by worsening the provision of health care services, or it simply cut 
down the inefficiencies in health care services provision by RGs. To do so, we need 
both to ‘measure’ expectations in some ways, and to separate efficient from 
inefficient spending. We approach these two problems in turn. 
3. Identifying bailout expectations 
3.1. The ‘intergovernmental game’ 
In order to ‘measure’ expectations, in this section we briefly sketch a theoretical 
framework useful for the following empirical analysis. We borrow from BT09, that 
provide some fundamental predictions for our test on the effects of bailout 
expectations on citizens’ well-being. The authors consider a dynamic game with 
incomplete information; there are two players (here levels of government), a CG and 
a RG. The timing of the game strictly mirrors the relationships in the Italian NHS: 
at the first stage, CG finances RG, by choosing between two levels of funding (F), 
low or high, F= {FL, FH}, where FH>FL>0. At the second stage of the game, having 
observed F, RG can then decide between two levels of expenditure (E), low or high, 
E = {EL, EH}, where EH>EL>0. Notice that, if RG replies with the corresponding 
level of expenditure to the funding decision of the CG, the regional budget is in 
equilibrium: (FH – EH) = (FL – EL) = 0, and the game ends here. In fact, assuming 
RG cannot cash the difference between expenditure and funding implies that, if CG 
sets FH at the beginning of the game, then RG can only respond by setting EH. On 
the contrary, when CG sets FL at the first stage of the game, RG can either react by 
setting EL (and the game is again over), or by choosing EH and running a deficit. In 
this case, it is again CG’s turn to move in the third stage of the game. It can either 
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refuse to accommodate the deficit; or it can accommodate, partly or fully, this 
increased regional expenditure by giving more money to the region.  
BT09 assume that: i) CG prefers low financing and low expenditure, both 
when the bailing out occurs and when it does not; ii) RG prefers high expenditure 
and high financing (and the sooner the better), but if it had to finance itself the 
deficit in the case of low financing, it would prefer to cut expenditure immediately; 
iii) it is Pareto-efficient to constrain funding and expenditure at the low level – hence 
EL is the structural expenditure, i.e., the level of spending necessary to guarantee 
citizens’ well-being, while [EH – EL] identifies spending inefficiency; iv) there are two 
possible types of CG: a ‘tough’ CG, and a ‘weak’ CG. The ‘tough’ type will enforce 
fiscal discipline towards sub-national governments, and will not bail out RG deficit. 
On the contrary, the ‘weak’ CG will easily indulge in bailouts. The type is a private 
information of CG, hence RG needs to form some expectations on CG type: RG 
expects to face a ‘tough’ CG with a positive probability p.  
As shown by BT09, the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game imply that:  
«a ‘weak’ CG can take advantage of RG uncertainty by mimicking the ‘tough’ type, since 
– if it can convince RG that it is ‘tough’ – it might reach the Pareto-efficient outcome, i.e., 
a low level of funding coupled with a low level of expenditure, hence a situation without 
any deficits».5  
From this result, the following testable implications can be derived: 
(a) ceteris paribus, it should be more likely to observe a low level of ex-ante CG funding 
FL when p is high than when p is low; 
(b) having observed a low level of ex-ante funding FL, RG is more likely to react with a 
low level of health expenditure EL, when p is high than when p is low. 
In other words, when the probability p to face a ‘tough’ CG is high, a low level of ex-
ante funding is perceived as a more reliable signal that CG is indeed ‘tough’; 
therefore, RG reacts by choosing a low level of spending. Jointly considered, these 
two theoretical predictions suggest to investigate the effects of bailout expectations 
                                                 
5 We refer interested readers to the original paper for the formal proof of this result. 
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on RGs spending performance by testing the impact of ‘expected’ funding, i.e., ex-
ante CG funding conditional to RGs expectations on p. The crucial empirical problem 
– to be discussed next – is how to find proper proxies for changes in p. 
3.2. From the theory to the data 
Changes in p mean a shift in bailout expectations, due to a strengthening of CG’s 
commitment technology: when it is more costly for CG itself to run deficits (due for 
instance to external constraints) and when there are new tools for RGs to respect 
their budget (for instance, because of larger tax bases, or an electoral system that 
increase the accountability of local politicians), then the probability to face a ‘tough’ 
CG increases. The problem is how to model this shift. 
We follow here BT09 and exploit a ‘quasi-natural experiment’ in Italy. In 
particular, the link between theoretical model and observable variables is based on 
the consideration of key events in the Italian economic history starting from the 
‘90s, and their potential impact on p. The list includes the following events: 
• 1992: a severe financial crisis, determined by an unsustainable level of both public 
deficit and public debt, which lead the country close to default and opened the door 
to a season of reforms; 
• 1993: a structural reform of the NHS, which introduced more autonomy for Local 
Health Units in charge of providing services to citizens, and separated the third 
party payer from hospitals (the providers of services), to create a quasi-market 
competition similar to the one experienced in the English NHS; 
• 1994: a reform of the National voting system, with the aim of strengthening CG 
and its ability to implement reform and manage the public budget (notice that 
duration of government during the ‘80s was less than one year); 
• 1995: a reform of the Regional voting system, with the aim of increasing the 
accountability of Regional Governors in charge of managing resources for health 
care (notice that approximately 80% on average of regional expenditures are for 
health care services); 
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• 1997: the ‘Maastricht test’, that is the provision of the Maastricht Treaty – ratified 
at the end of 1993 – to examine EU countries in order to define the first group of 
participants to the European monetary union (EMU) and the adoption of the Euro. 
The test was mainly based on two parameters of public finances sustainability, 
specifically the debt-to-GDP ratio < 60% and the deficit-to-GDP ratio < 3%; 
• 1997: the introduction of a new regional tax (IRAP), aimed at reducing vertical 
imbalance, and at increasing regional accountability; 
• 1998: the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty (better known as the Stability and 
Growth Pact, SGP from now on), which define conditions for remaining in the EMU. 
In particular, a close-to-zero deficit was required in the medium run; in any case, 
public deficit-to-GDP ratio cannot be more than 3%.6 
Starting from the above list of key events, we define a set of proxies for 
changes in p, i.e. the probability to observe a ‘tough’ CG, defining a list of variables 
that should have had an impact on the commitment technology of CG. The proxies 
we use in the following empirical analysis are: 
a) an index of Public Budget Tightness (PBT), defined as the ratio between the 
Italian deficit and the average EU deficit, to capture potential variations in the way 
external constraints are imposed. For instance, if all EU countries share the same 
fiscal difficulties, a political decision could be made to soften financial rules. Indeed, 
this is exactly what happened at the beginning of the new century with the rules 
imposed by the SGP; 
b) a dummy to capture the effects of external constraints imposed by the 
Maastricht Treaty (DMAAS = 1 from 1994 to 1997);  
                                                 
6 Differently from the Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has experienced 
several difficulties: provisions have been suspended for some years, after fiscal crises affecting 
Germany and France. After this suspension, European Governments struggled to reach a new 
agreement. The newly reformed Pact contains provisions conditional on the public finance of each 
country and taking into account cyclical considerations, all of which suggest more politically oriented 
judgements than technical rules. Difficulties of the SGP came back again recently in the case of the 
Greek financial crisis. More on this point will be discussed below. 
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c) a dummy for the 1997 EMU exam (DEUR = 1 in 1997), to capture the differential 
impact of the ‘exam year’ with respect to the rules imposed by the Maastricht 
Treaty; 
d) a dummy to capture the effects of external constraints imposed by the SGP (or 
Amsterdam Treaty, DAMST = 1 for the periods 1998-2003 and 2005-2006; notice that 
we excluded 2004, because provisions by the SGP were suspended in that year); 
e) a proxy for the per capita tax base of regional taxes (TAXBASE), to capture the 
impact due to an increase in regional own resources registered during the sample 
period; 
f) a dummy to control for ‘political alignment’ effects (DGOV = 1 if RG and CG 
coalitions in power are the same), to capture the potential impact of friendly 
governments in terms of a more generous funding (when monies are available) or a 
more effective control on expenditure (when fiscal discipline is required). 
Notice that proxies (a) to (d) show time variability only, while proxies (e) and (f) 
show both time and cross-section variability. This means that proxies (a) to (d), 
basically the rules imposed by the EU, affect all Regions contemporaneously and in 
the same way; on the contrary, proxies (e) and (f) affect different Regions in 
different ways. Hence, expectations are different for different Regions. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Data and empirical strategy 
The empirical analysis is based on a balanced panel of the 15 Italian Ordinary 
Statute Regions over the years 1993-2006.7 The main source of data is the official 
database Health for All managed by the Italian Central Institute of Statistics 
                                                 
7 As already mentioned, we excluded from the analysis the five Special Statute Regions (Valle 
d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardegna, Sicilia), because the way they are 
financed and they can organise the provision of health services follows different rules. In particular, 
«they enjoy wider autonomy [in the choice to allocate CG funds], and also receive a higher than 
average share of government funding. In addition, their self-government rights extend to an 
additional number of policy areas, such as primary and secondary education, culture and arts and 
subsidies to industry, commerce and agriculture» (Rico and Cetani, 2001: p. 5) 
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(ISTAT), integrated with information extracted from the Supplements to the 
Statistical Bulletin by the Bank of Italy, and the General Report on the Economic 
Situation of the Country (Relazione Generale sulla Situazione Economica del Paese) 
by the Italian Ministry of the Economy. All financial variables are expressed in 2006 
€ per capita by using a CPI index.8 
As for the empirical strategy, we consider the ‘substitution method’ 
suggested by BT09. The main objectives of the paper are: to test theoretical claim (b) 
that, after having observed a low level of ex-ante CG funding, RGs should be more 
likely to react with a low spending level the higher is p; and, more importantly, to 
verify whether changes in p (i.e., in bailout expectations) impact the efficient 
component and/or the waste component of overall spending. Since CG funding is not 
exogenously given, but – according to the theoretical framework sketched above – 
depends itself on the commitment technology available for CG, we need to go along 
the following steps: 
• we first check the effects of changes in p on ex-ante CG funding (FUNDST), by 
estimating a model of funding which includes the proxies for bailout expectations 
discussed above among the regressors; 
• we then get ‘expected’ funding (i.e., predicted ex-ante CG funding given changes in 
p) from first step estimates and insert this variable (EXPFUNDST) in a proper health 
production function/frontier; 
• we finally check whether EXPFUNDST affects structural expenditure (hence, 
citizens’ health) and/or inefficiency (hence, excess spending given a certain health 
output). 
4.2. Modelling ex-ante central government funding 
We define – differently from BT09 – the variable FUNDST as the difference between 
total funding and regional funding. This is a measure of the ex-ante CG transfers per 
                                                 
8 A sector specific retail price index is unavailable. However, the use of a general CPI index seems 
more appropriate, since most of the health care services are provided free of charge to citizens and the 
biggest expenditure share (personnel costs) varies according to the CPI index. 
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capita to each Region, i.e. the topping up on regional own resources which 
constitutes the first step in regional health care funding. We then estimate the 
following CG funding model [1]:  
FUNDSTit = a0 + a1TAXBASEit + a2PBTt + a3DGOVit + a4DEURt 
+ a5DMAASt + a6DAMSTt + a7TRENDt + REGi + εit [1] ∑
=
14
1i
iα
i = 1, ..., 15;  t = 1993, ..., 2006 
where REG are individual fixed-effects, to take into account structural differences in 
health spending needs across RGs, and TREND is a linear trend that captures the 
evolution of ex-ante CG funding linked to the dynamics of expenditure reflecting 
technical progress in health care delivery (see section 4.3). Table 1 reports descriptive 
statistics for the variables included in Eq. [1]. 
[INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE] 
Table 2 shows Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimates of ex-ante 
CG funding model [1].9 All proxies for changes in bailout expectations – but DGOV10 
– are strongly statistically significant and show a sign consistent with our a priori 
and previous findings by BT09. An increase in the tax base given to regions should 
increase their ability to cope autonomously with their deficits, and this should make 
more credible the threat by CG not to bail them out (hence, the coefficient of 
TAXBASE < 0). As Maastricht requirements become more binding, CG should be 
perceived as tougher (hence, the coefficient of DMAAS < 0), and this effect should be 
                                                 
9 One may argue that also the stock of Regional governments debt influences bailout expectations. 
The larger the debt (relative to regional resources), the higher the likelihood of default risk, and CG 
bailout. Regional debts data are only available for a shorter time span. Nevertheless, we tested for 
this effect but found no significant evidence, presumably because of the inclusion in the model of the 
time trend and the regional fixed effects. More importantly, almost all the results presented in this 
section are unaffected. Results from this additional specification are not reported here for brevity, but 
are available upon request from the authors. 
10 Perhaps a ‘help out’ action by friendly Regions – aimed at cooperating with CG in controlling 
public expenditure and deficit – was in place up to 1997, before the ‘Maastricht test’ (like in BT09), 
whilst an opposite effect prevailed from 1998, due to RGs expectations of a more ‘benevolent’ 
treatment in terms of ex-post funding by a friendly CG than by an adversary one. See Arulampalan et 
al. (2009) for further discussion on this issue. 
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more important the higher the Italian deficit with respect to the EU average (hence, 
the coefficient of PBT < 0), and the closer the deadline for the admission test to be 
included in the first group of countries adopting the Euro (hence, the coefficient of 
DEUR < 0). On the other hand, the positive impact exerted on CG funding by the 
introduction of the SGP (coefficient of DMAAS > 0) may be explained by the 
weaknesses of the Amsterdam Treaty in itself compared to the provisions of the 
Maastricht Treaty. These fragilities led European governments to perceive the 
threat of exclusion from the EMU as an unlikely event, and – in turn – brought RGs 
to increase their expectations of future bailouts by CG.11 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Overall, as it is suggested by theoretical prediction (a), we effectively observe 
a lower level of ex-ante CG funding when p is high than when p is low. This is true also 
on a different and longer time span with respect to the one considered by BT09, that 
was limited to the ‘90s only. Table 3 provides some insights on the quantitative 
impact of bailout expectations on ex-ante CG funding, by computing EXPFUNDST 
at different values of our proxies for p and in different years: one can notice, in 
particular, the relatively modest effect exerted by PBT compared to TAXBASE 
(e.g., EXPFUNDST in 2004 ranges between 913 and 965 € per capita in the former 
case, against 510–1,297 in the latter case), which highlights the importance of 
strengthening the fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments in order to reduce 
bailout expectations and CG transfers. Furthermore, the positive time dynamics 
(coefficient of TREND > 0), combined with a rise in bailout expectations due to 
weakened external constraints imposed by the Amsterdam Treaty, help explain the 
marked upward trend of EXPFUNDST observed starting from 1998, compared to 
                                                 
11 Notice that the possibility that some member states might in the future obtain back their monetary 
sovereignty is not even considered in European Treaties. As argued by Bordignon and Brusco (2001), 
the absence of explicit provisions can be seen as a commitment device to increase stability. However, 
the increased stability can probably lower the expectations that penalties and automatic sanctions 
will be effectively applied in the case of fiscal crisis; and – in turn – soften the countries budget 
constraints. The example of Greece seems to provide evidence for this effect to be effectively at work. 
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the previous years, when more severe fiscal rules for accessing EMU were in force 
(see Figure 4 below). 
4.3. Modelling regional government spending 
4.3.1. Model specification and estimation method 
A crucial issue to understand whether bailout expectations affected structural health 
expenditure, or just impacted on inefficiencies and wastes, is the identification of the 
efficient and inefficient components of RGs spending for health care policies. To this 
aim, we assume that health care outcomes result from a standard microeconomic 
‘production function’, where population health is the output, spending and other 
health-related variables are the inputs, and a process of optimization underlies the 
observed data.12  
The bulk of previous studies assessing health systems’ performance assume  
maximization of health given a certain amount of expenditure as the objective to be 
pursued by the policy maker. However, considering the Italian context described 
above, the rapid growth in public health spending for all European countries in the 
last decades, the significantly higher health status compared to less developed 
contexts, and the role played by public finance constraints imposed by European 
rules, we assume here that the goal of RGs consists in minimizing the cost of 
providing a certain level of health output, given other inputs and a set of control 
variables. This issue can be addressed by modelling RGs spending behavior as an 
input requirement function. This concept was first introduced by Diewert (1974), and 
later extended by Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1995) to incorporate inefficiency in 
the production process, i.e., the use of excess input compared to the optimal 
(minimum) need defined by a ‘best-practice’ frontier.13 
                                                 
12 This is the approach commonly used to assess the performance of health care systems. Examples 
from this strand of literature include, e.g., Grubaugh and Santerre (1994), Or (2000), Hollingsworth 
and Wildman (2002), Greene (2004), Retzlaff-Roberts et al. (2004), Afonso et al. (2005), Kumbhakar 
(2010). 
13 For a comprehensive and critical review of the literature on production/cost frontier modelling and 
efficiency measurement, see the handbooks by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and Coelli et al. (2005). 
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The identification of a proper outcome for quantifying the impact of health 
care policies on well-being is a rather difficult issue, because the effectiveness of 
health services can be assessed by considering a variety of aspects (e.g., length and 
quality of life, equity in accessing the services, etc). According to most of the past 
studies on health systems’ efficiency and the literature on public health, we adopt 
two traditional measures of population health and proxy the output (Y) both as 
average life expectancy at birth (ALE) and infant mortality rate (IMR). We also 
experimented with average life expectancy at different ages, namely at 45 (ALE45) 
and at 75 (ALE75), to capture the impact of public care on avoidable mortality due 
to illnesses typically affecting health around these lifetimes (e.g., cardiovascular 
diseases or cancers). 14 
As for the basic inputs of health production process, per capita public and 
private health care expenditure and average education level of the population have 
been typically used in the existing literature. Coherently, we define per capita RGs 
health spending (HPUB) as the dependent variable of the input requirement 
function, and per capita private health spending (HPRIV) and the percentage of 
people with higher education (EDUUNIV)15 as the other productive factors (INPUT).  
In addition, we augment our specification with a set of control variables (CV ) 
that are likely to generate possible shifts in the production relationship, both over 
time and across Regions.16 Specifically, we include: a time trend variable (TREND) 
to take into account possible improvements in health care delivery over years due to 
                                                 
14 Life expectancy is the average number of years of life remaining at a given age and, in the database 
Health for All, it is computed separately for men and women. Therefore, male and female life 
expectancies have been averaged by male and female populations, in order to obtain a single index. 
Infant mortality rate is given by the number of children who die during the first year of life per 
10,000 newborns. Some recent studies (e.g., Hollingsworth and Wildman, 2002; Gravelle et al., 2003; 
Greene, 2004; Kumbhakar, 2010) have measured health outcomes in terms of Disability Adjusted Life 
Expectancy (DALE), an indicator of healthy life expectancy which differs from ‘pure’ life expectancy 
or mortality indices in that it considers the quality of life besides its length. However, information on 
DALE disaggregated at regional level is just available for a couple of years. 
15 This variable is computed as the share of persons with a university degree out of the total regional 
population. We thank Anna Laura Mancini for kindly providing these data. 
16 Or (2000), Gravelle et al. (2003) and Greene (2004) argued about the importance to enrich the basic 
input-output relationship of the health production process, by adding further covariates able to 
account for some of the widespread heterogeneity that is usually present in this type of data. 
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technical change; two demographic indicators, i.e., the share of males (MALE) and 
of people older than 75 (OLD75), which are expected to exert a negative and positive 
impact, respectively, on the minimum level of HPUB required to attain a given level 
of Y, ceteris paribus17; a variable accounting for the effect of bailout expectations, 
i.e., EXPFUNDST obtained from estimates of Eq. [1] (the way we test whether this 
factor  is a shifter of the frontier or affects the inefficiency is discussed later); finally, 
given the wide variation in cultural and economic characteristics of our sample 
(especially between Northern and Southern Regions), which is likely to influence 
health policy outcomes, we incorporate individual fixed-effects (REG) in the 
estimated model, so as to control for unobserved heterogeneity across Regions. Table 
4 shows summary statistics for all the variables included in the input requirement 
function; to support the choice of using panel data methods, one can notice that 
both the dependent variable and the regressors show enough variation in the data, 
both over time and across Regions.18 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Following Greene (2004, 2005b) and Or (2000), we adopt a simple Cobb-
Douglas specification.19 The model (in logarithmic form) to be estimated is then: 
lnHPUBit =  b0 + b1lnYit + b2lnHPRIVit + b3lnEDUUNIVit  + b7TRENDt 
+ b4lnMALEit+ b5lnOLD75it + b6lnEXPFUNDSTit + REGi + eit [2] ∑
=1i
iβ
14
                                                
i = 1, ..., 15;  t = 1993, ..., 2006 
 
17 The importance of technological change and demographic factors such as age and gender is widely 
debated in the empirical literature on health spending determinants. Chernichovsky and Markowitz 
(2004) provide a survey of the main findings of these studies and an interesting analysis of the Israeli 
experience. 
18 In particular, within variation is dominant for HPUB, ALE, IMR, EDUUNIV and EXPFUNDST, while 
the variation between Regions prevails in HPRIV, MALE and OLD75.      
19 In principle, the flexible translog form should be used to approximate at best an arbitrary underlying 
function. However, due to the high multicollinearity among the regressors (which include interacted 
and squared terms) and the limited degrees of freedom, in past studies the translog specification often 
resulted in parameter estimates failing to satisfy some of the basic properties of production theory. 
Therefore, as remarked by Greene (2004, p. 968), a strictly orthodox interpretation of the relationship 
between the health outcomes and the inputs as perfectly conforming to a neoclassical production 
function is likely to be optimistic, and the use of looser approximations is then justified.     
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which can be concisely rewritten as:  
lnHPUBit =  f (lnYit, lnINPUTit, lnCVit ) + eit [3] 
The residual term, eit, can be thought either 1) as pure random noise – like in a 
standard average function approach, not accounting for the presence of productive 
inefficiency in observed health spending – or 2) as a composed error term, resulting 
from the sum of idiosyncratic noise (vit) and a nonnegative inefficiency term (uit) – 
like in a frontier function approach, where actual health spending is allowed to 
exceed the optimal (minimum) requirement. According to the latter interpretation, a 
Region that is managing more efficiently the provision of health care will, ceteris 
paribus, have a lower per capita expenditure, reflected in a lower value of uit. This 
allows us to interpret exp(uit) = {HPUBit /exp[ f (lnYit, lnINPUTit, lnCVit ) + vit]} as the 
percentage increase in health spending with respect to the stochastic ‘best-practice’ 
level, which is due to productive inefficiency. When uit = 0 for a particular Region i 
in year t, all inefficiencies are eliminated and the ‘best-practice’ input requirement 
frontier is attained.20 
Starting from these premises, we proceed with the estimation of three 
different version of the input requirement model [2]: 
• an average health spending function, where our key variable EXPFUNDST appears 
as an explicative factor for the whole HPUB – without distinguishing the efficient (or 
structural) component from the inefficient one – thus, closely mirroring BT09. In 
this case, the residual is assumed to be a symmetric normally distributed random 
variable, eit ~ N(0,σe2), and the model is estimated by LSDV;    
• two frontier health spending functions, in which eit = (vit + uit), with vit ~ N(0,σv2) 
and uit ~ |N(μ,σu2)|, to indicate that inefficiency term is modelled as the absolute 
                                                 
20 Notice that exp(uit) takes values ranging between one (when uit = 0) and infinity (when uit → ∞). 
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value of a normally distributed random variable.21 In order to test whether or not 
bailout expectations influences excess spending, we follow the standard Battese and 
Coelli (1995) specification and allow the mean of the inefficiency to depend on 
EXPFUNDST, by assuming that μ is free to vary both across RGs and over years 
according to the expression:  
itμ = δ0 + δllnEXPFUNDSTit [4] 
Moreover, to provide an answer to the key question of our study – i.e., whether 
bailout expectations affect only productive inefficiency or also the structural 
component of health spending (the location of the frontier) – we first include 
EXPFUNDST in the vector of control variables CV of Eq. [3] (FULL MODEL) and, in a 
second frontier specification (RESTRICTED MODEL), we exclude it from CV (setting b6 
= 0 in Eq.[2]). Then, we use a standard LR test for selecting the best specification. 
In both cases, maximum likelihood (ML) is employed for the simultaneous 
estimation of the stochastic frontier parameters [3] and the spending inefficiency 
equation [4]. The log-likelihood function is formulated in terms of σ2 ≡ (σv2 + σu2) 
and γ ≡ σu2/(σv2 + σu2).22 The parameter γ must lie between 0 and 1 and provides 
useful information on the relative contribution of uit and vit to the global residual eit, 
hence on the importance of estimating a ‘best-practice’ frontier instead of an average 
input requirement function, by separating inefficiencies from structural spending.23 
It is important to highlight that adding the full set of regional dummies REG in the 
vector CV corresponds to implementing the ‘true’ fixed-effects ML frontier model 
proposed by Greene (2004, 2005a,b), which has the virtue to allow a distinction 
                                                 
21 This assumption means that uit arises from the truncation (at zero) of a normal distribution with 
mean μ and variance σu2 and can also be expressed as uit ~ N+(μ,σu2). On truncated normal 
distribution, see, e.g., Kumbhakar and Lowell (2000), pp. 74-86. 
22 The prediction of inefficiencies exp(uit) depends on all the parameters of the model and exploits the 
Battese and Coelli (1995) estimator. See also Kumbhakar and Lowell (2000), p. 78.  
23 As γ → 0, the symmetric noise component dominates the one-sided inefficiency term in determining 
the variation of total residual eit, while the inverse occurs as γ → 1. Notice that, in the former case, we 
are back to a traditional average spending model with no stochastic inefficiency, whereas in the latter 
case we face a deterministic frontier spending model with no random noise. 
  
19
between the unobserved cross-region heterogeneity, unrelated to inefficiency, and 
the inefficiency itself.24  
4.3.2. Results from the ‘average’ health spending function 
LSDV parameter estimates of Eq. [3] are reported in table 5. The value of adjusted 
R2 indicates that our model accounts for about 91% of the variability observed in 
public health care expenditure. The F statistic confirms the general goodness of fit. 
All the coefficients for output, inputs, time trend and demographic variables are 
found to be statistically significant and their magnitude is quite similar for the two 
model specifications using alternative output measures for health care policies (ALE, 
IMR)25. Furthermore, the significance of a high number of regional dummies 
(seven/six out of fourteen) supports the inclusion of individual fixed-effects in the 
model to control for unmeasured cross-region heterogeneity. As expected, HPUB 
increases with the targeted output (if Y = ALE; it clearly decreases if Y = IMR), 
while it shows a certain degree of substitutability with private health spending and 
with higher education. The latter result can be explained by the fact that higher 
educated people do more prevention, demand more preventive care, using non-
medical inputs and leading healthier lifestyles, so as to become more efficient users 
of care and producers of health; thus, ceteris paribus, the effect of rising EDUUNIV is 
to reduce the aggregate costs for health care.26 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
                                                 
24 A possible criticism against the use of fixed effects in nonlinear models is the incidental parameters 
problem (Lancaster, 2000), a persistent bias that typically arises in short panels. However, existing 
evidence in support of this view is all based on binary choice models, whereas Greene (2005a,b), 
relying on Monte Carlo simulation applied to stochastic frontier models, found that the biases in 
coefficient estimates are small and, more importantly, there appear to be only minor biases 
transmitted to inefficiency estimates.  
25 Results obtained proxying health with ALE45 and ALE75 are not reported here for brevity and are 
available upon request from the authors. However, they are substantially close (also in terms of 
magnitudes) to those discussed in the text, both for the ‘average’ spending function and for the 
‘frontier’ model.  
26 For further discussion on this issue, see Chernichovsky and Markowitz (2004) and Kumbhakar 
(2010).  
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The positive coefficient of TREND shows that RGs health spending increases 
at an annual rate of about 3-4%. To some extent, this growth over time of HPUB is 
due to changes in medical technology, implying better and more costly treatments.27 
As for the impact of demographic factors, the negative coefficient of MALE 
indicates that females are more likely to visit health providers than males28; 
moreover, the positive effect of POP75 confirms that a rise in the share of the elderly 
out of total population tends to cause higher health costs, because of the increased 
incidence of chronic diseases, as well as the closer proximity to death.29 
Turning now the attention to the impact of bailout expectations on spending 
performance of RGs health care policies, EXPFUNDST coefficient has the expected 
positive sign and it is statistically significant and similar in magnitude using both 
output specifications: it suggests that, ceteris paribus, a 10% increase (decrease) in 
‘expected’ CG funding brings about roughly a 0.65% increase (decrease) in public 
health spending used by RGs to guarantee a certain outcome in terms of average life 
expectancy or infant mortality. For instance, looking at sample means of ‘expected’ 
CG funding and RGs health spending, when EXPFUNDST diminishes from 798 to 
718 € per capita, HPUB reduces from 1,360 to 1,351 € per capita.30 Hence, relying on 
a different modeling approach (i.e., the input requirement function) and a longer 
time span, we find again the result emerged in BT09, which suggests that RGs react 
to expectations of a tighter CG in terms of funding with a tighter control on health 
care expenditure. What we do not know yet is whether this effort by the CG to 
harden the budget constraint of RGs affects the structural component of health 
spending – implying some real effects on citizens’ well-being – or it simply reduces 
                                                 
27 A similar finding has been obtained in a recent study on Swiss health care system by Filippini et al. 
(2006). In general, technical progress is considered an essential factor in rising health care costs (see 
Newhouse, 1992). 
28 In particular, Chernichovsky and Markowitz (2004) point to a remarkable increase in the number of 
visits to doctors and specialists by females between 25 and 64 year old, and in the number of visits to 
nurses by females between 25 and 44 year old. 
29 Evidence supporting this view is found, among others, in Giannoni and Hitiris (2002), Seshamani 
and Gray (2004), and Filippini et al. (2006). See also Zweifel et al. (1999) for a discussion on the ‘death 
related costs’. 
30 Like in BT09, the effect of bailout expectations may seem modest. However, recall that we are 
controlling here for regional fixed-effects. 
  
21
the inefficiencies in health spending.31 To answer this challenging question, we 
estimate a frontier input requirement model, which allows us to disentangle the 
influence of bailout expectations on the two components of RGs health spending. 
4.3.3. Results from the ‘frontier’ health spending function 
ML estimates for parameters of stochastic frontier model defined by Eq. [3]-[4] are 
given in tables 6 (FULL MODEL) and 7 (RESTRICTED MODEL). In particular, the upper 
panel in each table shows the estimates of structural coefficients, which determine 
the location of the input requirement frontier, while the lower panel reports the 
estimates of the inefficiency-related coefficients (δ0 and δ1 in Eq. [4]) and of the two 
variance parameters (γ and σ2). 
[INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7 HERE] 
Looking first at the FULL MODEL specification – where EXPFUNDST is 
included both as a shifter of the frontier (lnHPUB) and as a determinant of excess 
spending (uit), the coefficients related to output, inputs, time trend and demographic 
variables are all statistically significant, using both output measures, and their 
magnitude is very close to the estimates obtained for the average input requirement 
function. As before, the significance of most regional dummies (eight/nine out of 
fourteen) confirms the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the data and the 
importance of including individual fixed-effects. The null hypotheses that spending 
inefficiency effects are absent (i.e., γ = δ0 = δ1 = 0, hence uit = 0) is tested using a 
generalized LR test, and it is rejected at the 1% significance level (5% if Y = IMR).32 
                                                 
31 It is worth noting that the output indicators we adopt do not allow to control for the ‘quality’ of 
health outcomes. Therefore, an increase observed in public spending devoted to guarantee a given 
output level (ALE or IMR) can be associated to an improvement of citizens’ well-being (e.g., by rising 
the quality of some relevant health services, with a real impact on the quality of life), as well as to a 
waste of resources (e.g., by providing inappropriate services, which clearly implies no real effects on 
well-being). However, data on DALE are not available for Italian regions. See footnote 14 above. 
32 Notice that difficulties arise in testing hypotheses where γ is equal to 0, as γ = 0 lies on the boundary 
of the parameter space for γ, and it cannot take negative values. In all these cases, if the null 
hypothesis is true, the LR statistic has an asymptotic distribution which is a mixture of χ 2 
distributions whose critical values are obtained from table 1 in Kodde and Palm (1986). 
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We can also notice that the estimate for γ is 0.672 (0.570 if Y = IMR): this result 
indicates that most of the residual variation is due to spending inefficiency and not 
to random noise, therefore supporting the argument that a traditional average 
response function with the term uit equal to zero does not adequately represent the 
observed performances of RGs health care policies.  
The picture relative to the estimates of structural coefficients, as well as of 
the variance parameter γ, is substantially unchanged for the RESTRICTED MODEL 
specification – where EXPFUNDST is omitted from the frontier (b6 = 0), while it is 
still playing a role as an inefficiency determinant. As table 6 shows, EXPFUNDST 
exerts a positive but not statistically significant impact on RGs health spending if 
included as a structural variable (the p-value for b6 is 0.49 if Y = ALE, 0.34 if Y = 
IMR), whereas its associated coefficient δl appears always highly significant when 
bailout expectations are assumed to influence excess spending (at 1% level if Y = 
ALE, 5% if Y = IMR), both in the restricted and full specifications. Thus, as these 
are two nested models, we compare the full specification of the frontier input 
requirement function against the restricted model by means of a standard LR test: 
as we find no evidence to reject the RESTRICTED MODEL33, we are allowed to 
conclude that bailout expectations do not significantly affect the position of the 
‘best-practice’ frontier (hence, they should not influence citizens’ well-being), while 
they seem to have a remarkable impact on spending inefficiency. The following 
comments, which discuss more in depth inefficiency estimates and the role played by 
EXPFUNDST, rely then on the results from the restricted specification (table 7). 
[INSERT TABLES 8 AND 9 HERE] 
 
                                                 
33 The p-value for the LR statistic is 0.517 if Y = ALE and 0.273 if Y = IMR. 
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Table 8 provides summary statistics for estimated inefficiencies.34 Excess 
spending ranges between 0.7% if Y = ALE (0.6% if Y = IMR) and 25.7% (18.6%), 
and average cost inefficiency is found to be 3% (2.5%).35 Considering the sample 
mean value of HPUB (1,360 €), this implies that RGs could reduce their health 
spending by 40 € per capita (34 € if Y = IMR) by taking care of all the wastes in 
health services delivery.36 Since our primary concern here are the effects of 
expectations of deficit bailout by CG – assessed by looking at ‘expected’ CG funding 
– table 9 shows the values of average inefficiency computed within different classes 
of EXPFUNDST defined by the following ranges: min-1st quartile, 1st  quartile-median, 
median-3rd quartile, 3rdquartile-max. The positive impact of bailout expectations on 
excess spending is well highlighted by the more-than-proportional increase of average 
cost inefficiency with the growth of EXPFUNDST: when EXPFUNDST raise from a 
low (412 € per capita, on average) to a high level (1,194 € per capita, on average), we 
observe cost inefficiencies to augment from 1% to about 6% if Y = ALE (5% if Y = 
IMR). Figures 2-6 provide further evidence in support of increasing excess spending 
for increasing levels of ‘expected’ CG funding. In particular, the yearly trend of 
average cost inefficiency (computed using both output indicators) and EXPFUNDST 
suggests that fiscal discipline by CG towards RGs was effective in containing wastes 
during the mid ‘90s, when more severe rules for accessing EMU were in force. 
Starting from the end of the ‘90s, however, ex-ante CG funding – conditional to RGs 
expectations on p – began again to increase permanently, to some extent because of 
                                                 
34 Estimates of spending inefficiency for each RG in each year are reported in tables A1-A2 in the 
working paper version of this work. Notice that (average) regional inefficiencies are negatively related 
with the perceived quality of care services, thus confirming our claim of citizens’ satisfaction as an 
indirect proof of wastes (Figure 1). 
35 The quite low values of spending inefficency may be due to a second potential issue concerning the 
use of the true fixed effects model, i.e., the possibility that the inefficiency terms are underestimated. 
Indeed, if there is some region-specific persistent inefficiency, it is absorbed by the regional dummy 
included in the frontier, which is also capturing any time invariant heterogeneity. Unfortunately, as 
remarked by Greene (2004, p. 964), there is no simple solution to this problem, since the blending of 
inefficiency and unobserved heterogeneity is intrinsic to this modelling approach. 
36 Given the total Italian population of 60,045,068 inhabitants in 2008, this average efficiency recovery 
on per capita health spending would amount to an aggregate saving of about 2.5 billions € (2 billions 
€ if Y = IMR). 
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the weaker external constraints imposed by the SGP; with this growth of ‘expected’ 
CG funding, also health spending inefficiency sharply augmented. 
[INSERT FIGURES 2-6 HERE] 
Taken together, these findings are strongly in favour of the idea that lower 
bailout expectations, due to a more severe fiscal discipline by CG, have an influence 
only on regional excess spending, and have no real effects on citizens’ well-being. 
Therefore, enforcing fiscal discipline towards sub-national governments is expected 
to result in welfare improvements. 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper investigates whether fiscal discipline towards sub-national governments, 
in order to harden their budget constraints, exerts any real effects on the well-being 
of the citizens or simply helps to reduce waste of public monies. We consider the 
provision of health care services by Italian Regions, a policy resulting from a 
complex net of intergovernmental relations and that can strongly influence citizens’ 
welfare. We propose here to separate the efficient (or structural) component of 
regional health spending from the inefficient one (the excess spending), by 
estimating a frontier input requirement function. This modelling approach allows us 
to check whether bailout expectations – used as an indicator of the effort put 
forward by Central Government to induce fiscal discipline in sub-national Regional 
Governments – influence only spending inefficiencies or they have any real effects on 
citizens’ health. 
Our empirical analysis provides at least two interesting findings: first, there is 
evidence confirming that ex-ante Central Government funding is heavily affected by 
bailout expectations, and this suggests that Central Government can enforce fiscal 
discipline towards sub-national governments by fixing the level of funding. Second, 
and most importantly, controlling for other relevant inputs in the production of 
health (private health expenditure and education) and for environmental factors 
(demographic structure of the population, technological change, and region-specific 
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individual effects), ‘expected’ funding (i.e., Central Government transfers conditional 
on expectations of deficit bailouts) influences only the inefficient component of 
Regional Governments spending. Fiscal discipline appears then effective in reducing 
wastes, without having any real effect on citizens’ health, one of the main facets of 
individual well-being. Whether this matters also for other welfare sectors (e.g., social 
assistance, education), and other countries where these policies are decentralised 
towards sub-national governments as well, is an appealing issue for future research. 
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 Table 1. Summary statistics for the variables of ex-ante CG funding model [1] a 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent var.   |    Mean     Std. Dev.       Min        Max | Obs. 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+------- 
FUNDST    overall |    798          279         319      1,484 |N = 210 
         between |                 163            |I = 15 
         within  |                 230                        |T = 14 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Bailout expect.   | 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
TAXBASE  overall |   16,403      7,216       5,570     29,506 |      
         between |               4,084                        |      
         within  |               6,036                        |      
PBT      overall |    1.43        0.50        0.38       2.62 |      
         between |                   -                        |      
         within  |                0.50                        |      
DGOV              overall |    0.60        0.49           0          1 |      
         between |                0.18                        |      
         within  |                0.46                        |      
DEUR       overall |    0.07        0.26           0          1 |      
         between |                   -            |      
         within  |                0.26                        |      
DMAAS      overall |    0.29        0.45           0          1 |      
         between |                   -            |      
         within  |                0.45                        |      
DAMST      overall |    0.57        0.50           0          1 |      
         between |                   -           |      
         within  |                0.50                        |      
a Financial values expressed in 2006 € per capita. 
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Table 2. LSDV estimates of ex-ante CG funding model [1] 
Dep. var. = FUNDST coefficient std. error 
Constant       862.533*** 45.666 
TAXBASE -0.033*** 0.003 
PBT        -23.042** 11.401 
DGOV -1.433 14.679 
DEUR      -122.357*** 31.893 
DMAAS      -198.453*** 27.101 
DAMST         47.667** 23.991 
TREND         59.576*** 3.549 
REG1      -110.068** 46.677 
REG2      -243.301*** 55.231 
REG3      -153.320*** 48.366 
REG4         46.598 43.424 
REG5        -92.108* 51.423 
REG6        -74.515* 45.379 
REG7   0.295 41.152 
REG8      -103.984*** 42.068 
REG9      -163.302*** 49.376 
REG10        -32.876 38.111 
REG11         66.234* 36.839 
REG12        -78.837** 36.116 
REG13        -49.542 35.998 
REG14 16.276 36.299 
F(21,188)   76.840*** 
Adjusted R2 0.884 
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Table 3. Impact of proxies for bailout expectations on ex-ante CG funding a 
‘expected’ CG funding (EXPFUNDST)  
  1994             2000 2004 
820 1,058 1,297 
464 702 941 
TAXBASE b Min 
Mean 
Max 33 272 510 
488 726 965 
464 702 941 
PBT (%) c Min 
Mean 
Max 437 675 913 
DEUR d 1 342 580 818 
DMAAS d 1 266 504 742 
DAMST d 1 512 750 988 
a Financial values expressed in 2006 € per capita. 
b EXPFUNDST computed at the mean of PBT and individual fixed-effects, with DGOV = DEUR = 
DMAAS = DAMST = 0.  
c EXPFUNDST computed at the mean of TAXBASE and individual fixed-effects, with DGOV = 
DEUR = DMAAS = DAMST = 0. 
d EXPFUNDST computed at the mean of TAXBASE, PBT and individual fixed-effects, with the 
other dummies equal to zero. 
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Table 4. Summary statistics for the variables of input requirement model [2] a 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent var.   |    Mean     Std. Dev.       Min        Max |Obs.  
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+------- 
H       overall |   1,360         231         936      2,022 |N = 210 PUB
         between |                  98                        |I = 15 
         within  |                 213                        |T = 14 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Output 1         | 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
ALE      overall |   79.51        1.30       76.32      82.24 |      
         between |                0.62       |      
         within  |                1.16       |     
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Output 2         | 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
IMR      overall |   48.40       15.56       20.02      92.14 |      
         between |                9.21       |      
         within  |               12.75       |     
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Inputs           | 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
H      overall |     421          94         209        632 |      PRIV
         between |                  83       |      
         within  |                  48       |      
                 |                                            | 
EDUUNIV   overall |   0.063       0.021       0.023      0.132 |      
         between |               0.010       |      
         within  |               0.018       |      
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Demographic var. | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------  
MALE     overall |   0.485       0.004       0.472      0.494 |      
         between |               0.003       |      
         within  |               0.001       |      
                 |                                            | 
OLD75    overall |   0.085       0.020       0.043      0.133 |      
         between |               0.017       |      
         within  |               0.011       |      
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Bailout expect.  | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
EXPFUNDST overall |     798         264         227      1,380 |      
         between |                 163       | 
         within  |                 212       |     
a Financial values expressed in 2006 € per capita. 
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Table 5. LSDV estimates of average input requirement function [2] 
 Output 1 (Y = ALE) Output 2 (Y = IMR) 
Dep. var. = lnHPUB coefficient std. error coefficient std. Error 
Constant -13.956* -7.397  7.604*** 2.285 
lnY    4.566*** 1.520 -0.067*** 0.025 
lnHPRIV   -0.623*** 0.068 -0.647*** 0.068 
lnEDUUNIV   -0.065** 0.026 -0.073** 0.036 
TREND    0.026*** 0.010  0.038*** 0.008 
lnMALE   -6.355*** 2.565 -4.778* 2.517 
lnOLD75    0.224** 0.100  0.284* 0.171 
lnEXPFUNDST    0.064** 0.026  0.065* 0.036 
REG1    0.201*** 0.057  0.174*** 0.058 
REG2    0.279*** 0.044  0.267*** 0.046 
REG3    0.179*** 0.041  0.177*** 0.042 
REG4    0.103 0.086  0.106 0.086 
REG5    0.268*** 0.083  0.280*** 0.082 
REG6    0.031 0.071  0.056 0.070 
REG7   -0.066 0.065 -0.050 0.065 
REG8    0.062 0.073  0.107 0.070 
REG9    0.323*** 0.051  0.331*** 0.051 
REG10   -0.045 0.045 -0.028 0.044 
REG11   -0.010 0.052 -0.012 0.053 
REG12    0.109* 0.064  0.042 0.061 
REG13   -0.058 0.040 -0.028 0.039 
REG14   -0.201*** 0.036 -0.231*** 0.036 
F(21,188) 98.540*** 97.530*** 
Adjusted R2                      0.907                      0.907 
Log-likelihood                  335.801                  332.806 
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%. 
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Table 6. ML estimates of frontier input requirement function [2] – FULL MODEL 
 Output 1 (Y = ALE) Output 2 (Y = IMR) 
Dep. var. = lnHPUB coefficient std. error coefficient std. Error 
Constant -14.709*** 1.124  9.111*** 1.107 
lnY    5.113*** 0.343 -0.054** 0.024 
lnHPRIV   -0.557*** 0.058 -0.607*** 0.068 
lnEDUUNIV   -0.110*** 0.041 -0.108** 0.045 
TREND    0.022*** 0.007  0.037*** 0.007 
lnMALE   -3.912*** 0.877 -2.578* 1.418 
lnOLD75    0.292** 0.141  0.350*** 0.139 
lnEXPFUNDST    0.029 0.041  0.039 0.041 
REG1    0.198*** 0.053  0.180*** 0.052 
REG2    0.292*** 0.042  0.289*** 0.045 
REG3    0.174*** 0.036  0.187*** 0.038 
REG4    0.165** 0.082  0.163* 0.086 
REG5    0.262*** 0.072  0.285*** 0.070 
REG6    0.043 0.065  0.078 0.064 
REG7   -0.044 0.058 -0.028 0.058 
REG8    0.058 0.060  0.114** 0.057 
REG9    0.373*** 0.039  0.380*** 0.047 
REG10   -0.041 0.040 -0.019 0.039 
REG11   -0.044 0.045 -0.031 0.044 
REG12    0.157*** 0.044  0.077* 0.043 
REG13   -0.030 0.025 -0.002 0.028 
REG14   -0.202*** 0.028 -0.239*** 0.030 
Inefficiency (uit)     
Constant   -2.171*** 0.866 -1.844* 0.980 
lnEXPFUNDST    0.311*** 0.122  0.263** 0.128 
σ2 = (σu2 + σv 2)    0.005*** 0.001  0.005*** 0.001 
γ = σu2/σ2    0.672*** 0.109  0.570*** 0.127 
Log-likelihood 341.606 337.289 
LR test (uit = 0)       11.610***        8.966** 
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%. 
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Table 7. ML estimates of frontier input requirement function [2] – RESTRICTED MODEL 
 Output 1 (Y = ALE) Output 2 (Y = IMR) 
Dep. var. = lnHPUB coefficient std. error coefficient std. error 
Constant       -13.584*** 1.306  9.741*** 0.860 
lnY 5.067*** 0.408 -0.055** 0.024 
lnHPRIV         -0.597*** 0.062 -0.629*** 0.063 
lnEDUUNIV         -0.118*** 0.039 -0.121*** 0.043 
TREND 0.024*** 0.007  0.039*** 0.006 
lnMALE         -3.438*** 1.164 -2.336** 1.079 
lnOLD75 0.360*** 0.143  0.392*** 0.133 
REG1 0.180*** 0.050  0.165*** 0.049 
REG2 0.277*** 0.034  0.269*** 0.036 
REG3 0.157*** 0.032  0.170*** 0.033 
REG4 0.145* 0.081  0.155* 0.082 
REG5 0.238*** 0.070  0.268*** 0.067 
REG6 0.015 0.062  0.060 0.061 
REG7         -0.077 0.057 -0.045 0.056 
REG8 0.030 0.058  0.097* 0.053 
REG9 0.372*** 0.039  0.375*** 0.041 
REG10         -0.065* 0.039 -0.031 0.037 
REG11         -0.067 0.047 -0.041 0.042 
REG12 0.163*** 0.047  0.082** 0.040 
REG13         -0.032 0.026 -0.002 0.026 
REG14         -0.231*** 0.028 -0.252*** 0.029 
Inefficiency (uit)     
Constant         -2.200** 0.935 -1.915* 1.124 
lnEXPFUNDST 0.315** 0.131  0.273** 0.132 
σ2 = (σu2 + σv 2) 0.005*** 0.001  0.005*** 0.001 
γ = σu2/σ2 0.681*** 0.106  0.589*** 0.144 
Log-likelihood 341.396 336.689 
LR test (uit = 0)       13.337***        9.939** 
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%.*** 
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Table 8. Summary statistics for spending inefficiency estimates 
 mean std. dev. min 1st quart. median 3rd quart. max 
Output 1 (Y = ALE) 0.030 0.028 0.007 0.014 0.021 0.034 0.257 
Output 2 (Y = IMR) 0.025 0.021 0.006 0.013 0.018 0.031 0.186 
 
 
Table 9. Average spending inefficiency by class of ‘expected’ CG funding (ECGF) a 
a ECFG values are expressed in 2006 € per capita.  
 
227 ≤ ECGF ≤ 596  
(average 412) 
596 < ECGF ≤ 763 
 (average 680) 
763 < ECGF ≤ 1009  
(average 886) 
1009 < ECGF ≤ 1380 
(average 1,194) 
Output 1 ( Y = ALE) 0.013 0.020 0.029 0.058 
Output 2 ( Y = IMR) 0.011 0.018 0.025 0.048 
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Figure 2. Plot of ‘expected’ CG funding and spending inefficiency (Y = ALE) 
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Figure 3. Plot of ‘expected’ CG funding and spending inefficiency (Y = IMR) 
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Figure 4. Average ‘expected’ CG funding by year (values in 2006 € per capita) 
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Figure 5. Average spending inefficiency by year (Y = ALE) 
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Figure 6. Average spending inefficiency by year (Y =IMR) 
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